

Patent Licensing and R&D Subsidy Policy

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Preface

This book deals with the theory of patent licensing and its implications for governments' R&D subsidy policy. The general aim of the research is twofold. First, different from the previous studies on licensing that focus mainly on homogeneous goods markets, it analyzes the general licensing problems in the framework of product-differentiated markets, that is, the problems of the optimal licensing, the optimal choice of the quality of licensed technology with and without imitation and the optimal design of license contracts that discourage imitation under different patent systems. Second, it combines the licensing literature with R&D subsidy literature and provides new insights into the impact of the possibility of licensing on governments' R&D subsidy policy.

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