

Lehrstuhl für Kommunikationsnetze  
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Christian Wietfeld

# SECURE AND EFFICIENT ROUTING IN HIGHLY DYNAMIC WLAN MESH NETWORKS



## DISSERTATION

For the Degree of *Doktor-Ingenieur*  
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*To all people deprived of education.*

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# Abstract

Recent advances in embedded systems, energy storage, and communication interfaces, accompanied by the falling prices of WLAN routers and a considerable increase in the throughput of a WLAN (IEEE 802.11), have facilitated the proliferation of WLAN Mesh Network (WMN) applications. In addition to their current deployments in less dynamic community networks, WMNs have become a key solution in various highly dynamic scenarios. For instance, WMNs are intended to interconnect self-organized, cooperative, and small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in a wide range of applications, such as emergency response, environmental monitoring, and ad-hoc network provisioning. Nevertheless, WMNs still face major security challenges as they are prone to routing attacks. Consequently, the network can be sabotaged and, in the case of UAV-WMN-supported missions, the attacker might manipulate payload data or even hijack UAVs.

Contemporary security standards, such as the IEEE 802.11i and the security mechanisms of the IEEE 802.11s mesh standard, are vulnerable to routing attacks, as experimentally shown in this research. Therefore, a secure routing protocol is indispensable for making feasible the deployment of WMNs in critical scenarios, such as UAV-WMN-assisted applications. As far as the author of this thesis knows, none of the existing research approaches for secure routing in WMNs have gained acceptance in practice due to their high overhead or strong assumptions.

In this research, a new approach, which is called Position-Aware, Secure, and Efficient mesh Routing (PASER), is proposed. This new proposal defeats more attacks than the IEEE 802.11s/i security mechanisms and the well-known, secure routing protocol Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN), without making restrictive assumptions. It is shown that PASER achieves—in realistic UAV-WMN scenarios—similar performance results as the well-established, non-secure routing protocols Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP) combined with the IEEE 802.11s security mechanisms. Two representative scenarios are considered: (1) on-demand ubiquitous network access and (2) efficient exploration of sizable areas in disaster relief. The performance evaluation results are produced using an experimentally validated simulation model of WMNs, realistic mobility patterns of UAVs, and an experimentally derived channel model for the air-to-air WMN link between UAVs. The findings of this evaluation are justified by the route discovery delay and the message overhead of the considered solutions.

*This research's main aim is to support the broad deployment of a secure routing protocol in highly dynamic WMNs, and the PASER features, presented here, are a major step towards achieving this goal.*



# Kurzfassung

Der technologische Fortschritt in verschiedenen Bereichen wie eingebetteten Systemen, Energiespeicherung sowie Kommunikationsschnittstellen und -protokollen, hat, unterstützt von sinkenden Preisen für WLAN-Hardware und dem deutlichen Anstieg der Übertragungsraten von WLAN-Technologien (IEEE 802.11), den Grundstein gelegt für die zunehmende Anzahl an Anwendungen von WLAN-Mesh-Netzen (WMNs). Diese haben sich neben der gegenwärtigen Verbreitung quasistatischer, Community-gestützter Funknetze vor allem zu einer Schlüsseltechnologie für hochdynamische Anwendungen entwickelt. Eine solche hochdynamische Anwendung ist beispielsweise die WMN-gestützte Kommunikation selbstorganisierender, miteinander kooperierender unbemannter Kleinflugkörper (UAVs) mit einer grossen Spanne an Einsatzbereichen, wie Bergungs- und Rettungseinsätze, Umweltüberwachung, Präzisionslandwirtschaft oder der Ad-hoc-Bereitstellung mobiler WLAN- und Mobilfunknetze. Mit zunehmendem Einsatz in solch kritischen Bereichen wachsen auch die Anforderungen an die Sicherheit. Gegenwärtige WMN-Technologien stehen hierbei noch vor grossen Sicherheitsherausforderungen, da diese keinen Schutz gegen Routing-Angriffe gewähren. Mithin besteht das Risiko, dass Angreifer Netze sabotieren und im Falle von UAV-Einsätzen Nutzdaten der UAVs manipulieren oder sogar die gesamte Kontrolle über einzelne UAVs übernehmen können.

Wie in dieser Dissertation gezeigt wird, sind derzeitige Sicherheitsstandards wie IEEE 802.11i oder auch die Sicherheitsmechanismen des Mesh-Standards IEEE 802.11s anfällig für Routingangriffe. Um einen sicheren Einsatz von WMNs im sensiblen und kritischen Umfeld wie den erwähnten UAV-WMN-basierten Anwendungsszenarien zu gewährleisten, muss auch das eingesetzte Routingprotokoll entsprechend sicher sein. Soweit dem Autor bekannt, konnte sich unter diesem Gesichtspunkt keine der existierenden Lösungen in der Praxis durchsetzen, da entweder der Overhead der verschiedenen Ansätze zu hoch oder aber die getroffenen Annahmen in Sinne der Sicherheit zu stark und damit in der Praxis lediglich begrenzt umsetzbar sind.

In dieser Arbeit wird ein alternativer, umfassender Ansatz namens Position-Aware, Secure and Efficient mesh Routing (PASER) vorgestellt. Dieses neue Routingverfahren bietet eine höhere Sicherheit gegen Routingangriffe als die bestehenden IEEE 802.11s/i-Sicherheitsmechanismen und sogar als das sichere Routingprotokoll Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN), wobei allerdings im Hinblick auf die praktische Einsetzbarkeit auf starke Annahmen verzichtet wird. Es wird gezeigt, dass PASER in realistischen UAV-WMN Szenarien eine vergleichbar hohe Performanz erreicht, wie sie mit dem derzeit weit verbreiteten, aber unsicheren Routingprotokoll Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP) in Kombination mit den IEEE 802.11s Sicherheitsmechanismen

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möglich ist. Zwei repräsentative Szenarien werden hierfür betrachtet: (1) ubiquitärer ad-hoc Netzzugriff und (2) die effiziente Erkundung grösserer Gebiete im Katastrophenschutz. Zur Leistungsbewertung werden ein durch Experimente validiertes OMNeT++-basiertes WMN-Modell mit wirklichkeitstreuem UAV-Mobilitätsmustern und eben falls ein aus Experimenten abgeleitetes Kanalmodell für die direkte Funkverbindung zwischen UAVs herangezogen. Bei der Analyse der Ergebnisse werden auch die Verzögerungen der Routenfindung und der Nachrichten-Overhead der Protokolle berücksichtigt.

*Diese Arbeit und das in diesem Rahmen erforschte PASER-Verfahren sollen einen wesentlichen Beitrag leisten auf dem Weg zur Entwicklung sicherer, praxistauglicher Routingprotokolle mit dem Ziel einer möglichst hohen Verbreitung eines solchen Protokolls in hochdynamischen WMNs.*

# Contents

<b>Abstract</b>	<b>IX</b>
<b>Kurzfassung</b>	<b>XI</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background for Conventional WLAN Mesh Networks . . . . .	1
1.2 The Need for Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Networks . . . . .	4
1.3 Problem Statement: Routing Security Issues . . . . .	6
1.4 Thesis Contributions . . . . .	7
1.5 Thesis Methodology . . . . .	9
1.6 Thesis Outline . . . . .	10
<b>2 Review of Routing in Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Networks</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1 Introduction to Routing in Highly Dynamic WMNs . . . . .	13
2.2 Routing Implementation Designs in Highly Dynamic WMNs . . . . .	15
2.3 Routing Philosophy Classes in Highly Dynamic WMNs . . . . .	16
2.3.1 Proactive Routing . . . . .	17
2.3.2 Reactive Routing . . . . .	23
2.3.3 Hybrid Routing . . . . .	27
<b>3 Secure Routing Issues in Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Networks</b>	<b>33</b>
3.1 Limitations of the IEEE 802.11 Security Frameworks . . . . .	35
3.1.1 Security Goals and Modes of Operation . . . . .	36
3.1.2 Establishing Secure Link—Personal Mode . . . . .	37
3.2 Deployment Impediments of Secure Routing Proposals . . . . .	40
3.2.1 Asymmetric-Key-Based Secure Routing Proposals . . . . .	40
3.2.2 Symmetric-Key-Based Secure Routing Proposals . . . . .	44
<b>4 On the Credibility of Simulating Highly Dynamic WLAN Mesh Networks</b>	<b>49</b>
4.1 Credibility of Simulating WMNs in OMNeT++ . . . . .	50
4.2 Applied Simulation Methodology . . . . .	51
4.3 Validation of WLAN Mesh Routing Models in OMNeT++ . . . . .	56
4.3.1 Theoretical Estimation of Network Saturation Throughput	56
4.3.2 Reference Testbed for WMNs . . . . .	63
4.3.3 Performance Evaluation in OMNeT++ and in the Testbed	64

<b>5</b>	<b>PASER: Position-Aware, Secure, and Efficient Mesh Routing</b>	<b>69</b>
5.1	PASER Assumptions . . . . .	70
5.1.1	Network Model . . . . .	70
5.1.2	Attacker Model . . . . .	70
5.2	PASER Secure Routing Goals . . . . .	72
5.3	PASER Building Blocks . . . . .	74
5.3.1	Generation of One-time Authentication Secrets . . . . .	77
5.3.2	Registration of Mesh Nodes . . . . .	78
5.3.3	Secure Communication Between Non-Trusted Neighbors . . . . .	80
5.3.4	Secure Communication Between Trusted Neighbors . . . . .	80
5.3.5	Dynamic Key Management . . . . .	82
5.4	Time Costs of the PASER Cryptographic Operations . . . . .	83
<b>6</b>	<b>Implementation of PASER in Simulation and in Practice</b>	<b>87</b>
6.1	Implementation in INETMANET-OMNeT++ . . . . .	87
6.1.1	Goals of the PASER Implementation in Simulation . . . . .	88
6.1.2	The Big Picture of the PASER Implementation in Simulation . . . . .	88
6.2	Implementation in Linux . . . . .	90
6.2.1	Routing Logic . . . . .	90
6.2.2	Generic Kernel Framework: ROUTE-O-MATIC . . . . .	92
6.2.3	Performance Evaluation of ROUTE-O-MATIC . . . . .	96
6.2.4	Validation of the Feasibility of PASER . . . . .	105
<b>7</b>	<b>Security Analysis of PASER</b>	<b>107</b>
7.1	Experimental Analysis of the Blackhole and Wormhole Attacks . . . . .	107
7.1.1	Experimental Blackhole Attack . . . . .	108
7.1.2	Experimental Wormhole Attack . . . . .	109
7.2	Security Comparison . . . . .	111
<b>8</b>	<b>Performance Analysis of PASER</b>	<b>115</b>
8.1	Analysis of the Route Discovery Delay . . . . .	116
8.1.1	Lower Bound for the Communication Costs . . . . .	116
8.1.2	Lower Bound for the Computational Costs . . . . .	117
8.1.3	Evaluation of the Route Discovery Delay . . . . .	120
8.2	Asymptotic Message Overhead . . . . .	121
8.3	Performance Evaluation . . . . .	123
8.3.1	Topology Models . . . . .	123
8.3.2	Traffic Models . . . . .	124
8.3.3	Channel Models . . . . .	124
8.3.4	Mobility Patterns . . . . .	126
8.3.5	Simulation Results . . . . .	127
<b>9</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>133</b>



<b>10 Directions for Future Research</b>	<b>137</b>
10.1 Virtual Localization Extension for Geographical Leashes . . . . .	137
10.1.1 Review of Countermeasures Against the Wormhole Attack	138
10.1.2 Review of Indoor Localization Schemes . . . . .	139
10.1.3 Requirements and Goals for Virtual Localization . . . . .	140
10.1.4 The Virtual Localization Extension Approach . . . . .	141
10.1.5 Selected Performance Results . . . . .	146
10.1.6 Open Issues . . . . .	148
10.2 Further Directions for Future Research . . . . .	148
<b>A Brief Introduction to Cryptography</b>	<b>151</b>
A.1 Symmetric-Key Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . .	152
A.1.1 Symmetric Ciphers . . . . .	152
A.1.2 Symmetric Message Authentication Algorithms . . . . .	154
A.2 Public-Key Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . .	155
A.2.1 RSA Ciphering . . . . .	156
A.2.2 RSA Digital Signature . . . . .	156
A.2.3 Asymmetric Key Distribution . . . . .	157
<b>B Brief Introduction to OMNeT++</b>	<b>159</b>
<b>C Overview of Modeling WLAN Mesh Networks in INETMANET</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>D Scientific Activity Report</b>	<b>163</b>
D.1 Publications . . . . .	163
D.1.1 Journal Submission . . . . .	163
D.1.2 Conferences . . . . .	164
D.1.3 Poster & Code Contribution . . . . .	165
D.2 Patent Application . . . . .	165
D.3 Internet Draft . . . . .	165
D.4 Scientific Activities . . . . .	166
D.4.1 Technical Program Committee Member . . . . .	166
D.4.2 Session Chair . . . . .	166
D.4.3 Reviewer . . . . .	166
D.5 Contributions to Collaborative Research Projects . . . . .	167
D.6 Supervision of Student Theses . . . . .	167
D.7 Mentoring of Seminars . . . . .	168
D.8 Teaching . . . . .	168
<b>List of Acronyms</b>	<b>169</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>175</b>